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and the Timing of Investment 
Alan J. Auerbach and James R. Hines, Jr. 
Important changes in the federal tax provisions affecting investment 
in business plant and equipment were enacted in 1982, 1984, and 1985. 
There is every reason to believe that 1986 will not be an exception to 
this pattern. Yet the methods economists use to measure the impacts 
of changes in the tax law generally assume that such changes will be 
permanent; they ignore problems of transition. Such analysis can be 
valuable for understanding the underlying differences among alterna- 
tive tax systems but may be uninformative about the short-run impact 
of tax reform on investment. Moreover, the effects of tax changes on 
the value of corporate securities is typically ignored, although the ef- 
fects may be quite large. 
Consideration of short-run effects on investment and market value 
requires a careful analysis of three elements of behavior that are nor- 
mally omitted from long-run analysis of tax reforms: the state of inves- 
tor expectations, the time lags involved in putting new capital in place, 
and the tax law’s distinctions between new and old capital. Continual 
tax  changes that may appear beneficial when examined in isolation 
have the potential to be destabilizing when used in combination and 
when anticipated by investors. To the extent that businesses require 
time to adjust to changing economic conditions, attempts at frequent 
fine-tuning of  the tax system may do little more than cause the stock 
market to fluctuate.  Additional changes in market value may be as- 
sociated with tax reforms that narrow or widen the gap between the 
tax benefits available to new and previously purchased assets. 
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This paper (see Martin Feldstein, ed.,  The  Effects of  Taxation on 
Capital Accumulation [Chicago: University  of  Chicago,  19871 ) pre- 
sents a framework for tax analysis that addresses these issues, focusing 
on the effects of tax policy on investment and market values over the 
past three decades and the potential  impact of a number of the tax 
reform plans that have been promulgated in recent months. The model 
separately considers investment in equipment and investment in plant. 
The tax law treats these two classes of  assets quite differently, and 
they exhibit different historical investment patterns.  The model also 
allows one to make different assumptions about the degree of investor 
anticipations of changes in tax policies and other economic conditions. 
By using parameters based on historical investment patterns, the model 
allows one to assess realistically the impact of particular policy changes. 
Our results for the period  1954-85 suggest that investors did take 
account of fluctuations in profitability, real interest rates, and the tax 
code in making their investment plans.  Simulations that assume that 
investors anticipated future changes in these variables produce more 
realistic annual investment patterns than those that assume all such 
changes were unanticipated. 
This historical period that we study was characterized by generally 
falling rates of tax on new corporate investment, particularly in equip- 
ment. Equipment received major benefits from the introduction of ac- 
celerated depreciation in 1954,  the investment tax credit in 1962,  the 
Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System in 1971,  and the Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System (ACRS) in  1981. Over the period, the fixed 
corporate'capital stock grew at a compounded annual rate of 3.9%, 
with equipment growing at a rate of 5.0%  per year, and structures at 
a rate of  3.1%.  It is interesting to ask how much of this growth was 
due to the tax incentives instituted over the same period. 
Our  simulations  suggest that  the  investment tax  credit alone ac- 
counted for a rise of 0.5%  per year in the annual growth rate of the 
equipment capital stock and 0.3% per year for the total fixed capital 
stock. However, there is also evidence that the timing of the investment 
tax  credit  destabilized  investment.  Equipment  investment  was  ex- 
tremely strong during the mid-l960s, partly because of the enactment 
of the credit. Yet our results suggest that investment would have been 
strong during this period even without the credit, because corporate 
investors enjoyed very high before-tax  profitability of capital during 
the period. On the other hand, the presence of ACRS during recent 
years has helped to lessen the observed decline in investment, which 
we attribute to reduced profitability and extremely high real interest 
rates.  One interesting  aspect of  the  simulations is their inability to 
explain the strong recovery of 1984 in equipment investment that oc- 
curred in the face of continuing low profitability and high real interest 
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Until the boom of  recent years, the poor performance of the stock 
market had proved a puzzle for economists. At least one reason for 
the declining real value of  the stock market may  have been the in- 
creasing distinction between the treatment of  new and old capital that 
accompanied incentives for new investment. As a fraction of the cor- 
porate fixed capital stock’s replacement value, the market value of the 
corporations themselves should have been about one-third lower in 
1985  than in  1954,  according to our simulations. This suggests that 
policies that have been good for investment have not necessarily been 
good for investors. Investment incentives make new capital more prof- 
itable but may reduce the relative value of old capital that lacks com- 
parable tax incentives. 
In this light, it is interesting to consider the effects of  a variety of 
proposed tax reforms, including the Bradley-Gephardt “Fair Tax,” the 
Treasury I1 plan, and the Rostenkowski plan, HR 3838, passed by the 
House of  Representatives in  January  1986. Each plan  shares three 
salient characteristics affecting fixed corporate investment: reductions 
in the corporate tax rate, repeal of the investment tax credit, and a 
move toward capital recovery allowances based on true economic de- 
preciation. Our simulation results suggest that all three plans would 
reduce fixed investment in the short run, with the reduction coming 
primarily in equipment. If the real, after-tax interest rate remains con- 
stant, then structures investment is predicted to rise under all three 
plans in the short run. The investment mix would be similar under the 
different plans, with the overall level of investment being highest under 
Treasury I1 and lowest under the Rostenkowski plan. 
Our simulations also predict large windfalls for existing capital assets 
under all three plans, with Bradley-Gephardt increasing the market 
value of  corporate fixed capital by the most at 26%,  and HR 3838 by 
the least, 16%,  again assuming a fixed after-tax interest rate. Thus, all 
three plans would reverse the trend of  the last three decades, when 
existing assets became less valuable relative to new ones with each 
new investment incentive. The predicted windfalls result from the re- 
duced corporate tax rate, which applies to new and old income sources 
alike, and the reduced value of depreciation allowances and investment 
tax credits available for new investment. They represent a very sub- 
stantial revenue cost to the Treasury of a magnitude several times larger 
than would have been recouped by the windfall tax on excess depre- 
ciation proposed as part of  Treasury 11. This Page Intentionally Left Blank9  Tax-Loss Carryforwards and 
Corporate Tax Incentives 
Alan J. Auerbach and James M. Poterba 
The recent decline in corporate tax revenues has generated new interest 
in the corporate income tax. During the last few years, low profitability 
and highly  accelerated depreciation allowances for new  investment 
have combined to generate tax losses for many firms. Some of  these 
firms have been able to carry their losses back against taxes paid in 
previous years, and they have received refunds. For other firms, how- 
ever, recent tax losses have exceeded the maximum potential carry- 
back. These firms must carry their unused tax losses forward and use 
them to offset taxable profits earned in the next fifteen years. 
For firms .with tax-loss carryforwards, the effective configuration of 
investment incentives may be substantially different than for fully tax- 
able firms. A firm that is currently taxable and expects to be taxable 
in the next few years will be able to use its depreciation deductions as 
soon as they accrue. For a firm with loss carryforwards that does not 
expect to become taxable in the near future, however, currently ac- 
cruing depreciation deductions may not be realized for many years. 
This reduces the effect of investment incentives, such as the investment 
tax  credit or accelerated depreciation allowances. Firms  with  loss 
carryforwards also receive a tax benefit, however. Their earnings on 
new projects may be virtually untaxed for several years, reducing the 
burden of  the corporate tax and therefore encouraging investment. 
This paper (see Martin Feldstein, ed.,  The Effects  of  Taxation on 
Capital Accumulation [Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 19871 ) 
estimates the importance of loss carryforwards for U.S. firms and then 
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calculates the impact of  these carryforwards on corporate investment 
incentives. We  focus on the period 1981-84  and gather data from cor- 
porate annual reports and 10-K  filings to determine which firms have 
tax loss carryforwards or are otherwise restricted in their use of  in- 
vestment incentives. We  find a substantial increase in the total stock 
of  outstanding loss carryforwards during the sample period, and find 
that at least 15%  of  corporations were carrying losses forward at the 
end of  1984. In some industries, the incidence of loss carryforwards is 
substantially higher. 
To  analyze the persistence of  loss carryforwards, we estimate the 
probability that firms with carryforwards  will exhaust them and become 
taxable between one tax year and the next. The data suggest that, 
between 1982 and  1984, ninety-one out of  100 firms with loss carry- 
forwards in  one year continued carrying losses forward in  the next 
year. Only nine out of  100 become fully taxable in a typical year; this 
suggests that, once a firm experiences a tax-loss carryforward, it may 
not return to currently taxable status for several years. For taxable 
firms, the odds of  entering the loss-carryforward position are small: 
only two firms in  100 move from being currently taxable to having a 
loss carryforward in a typical one-year period. The strong persistence 
of  loss carryforwards makes the deferral of  depreciation allowances a 
potentially significant effect on the firm’s investment incentives. 
We  summarize the effect of loss carryforwards on investment incen- 
tives using effective tax rates, which measure the total tax wedge be- 
tween the pretax and posttax return on investing in different assets. 
We  find that, under pre-1986 law, the effective tax rate for an investment 
in industrial equipment for a firm that is currently taxable is  -5.8%. 
The negative effective tax rate indicates that the combination of  ac- 
celerated depreciation and the investment tax credit actually subsidizes 
equipment investment for taxable firms. For loss-carryforward firms, 
however, the effective tax rate on equipment is 15.0%. Because these 
firms are unable to use accelerated depreciation allowances as they 
accrue, and because they are more likely to be taxable in the distant 
future when the investment is yielding taxable profits than in the near 
term when it is generating negative taxable income, the net effect of 
the tax system discourages these firms from undertaking equipment 
investments. A rather different picture emerges for the case of industrial 
buildings, where the taxable and tax-loss firms face similar effective 
tax rates. For the currently taxable firm, the effective tax rate on build- 
ings is 41.7%, while for the firm with a loss carryforward, it is 38.3%. 
The tax system provides a net disincentive to structures investment 
for both classes of  firms. 
The dramatic disparity in effective tax rates on equipment and the 
small differences for structures are due to the different time paths of 91  Tax-Loss Carryforwards and Corporate Tax  Incentives 
depreciation allowances for the two assets. For equipment, a firm’s tax 
status in  the near term is of  central importance in determining the 
present value of its depreciation deductions. For structures, however, 
the depreciation allowances accrue over a much longer horizon. The 
fraction of currently taxable firms that will have tax-loss carryforwards 
ten years from today is much higher than the fraction that will have 
losses in one year. Similarly, current loss-carryforward firms are more 
likely to have loss carryforwards again next year than ten years hence. 
Whether a firm has tax losses today is therefore a better predictor of 
its tax status during the relevant years for equipment allowances than 
for structures. This Page Intentionally Left Blank